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TAKING EXIT ROW SEATING SERIOUSLY
WENDY GERWICK*

I.

S AVY AIR

INTRODUCTION

travelers frequently request emergency exit row

seating in an effort to enjoy a more comfortable flight.

Travelocity.com, for example, describes an emergency exit row
as "a safe haven for those who prefer a kid-free flight experience, as children are not allowed to occupy these seats."' It further recommends emergency exit rows because they "provide
more leg room and often have fewer seats than a regular row."2
Most exit row passengers, however, after requesting to be seated
in an exit row, "do not read the safety information provided to
assist them in understanding the tasks they may need to perform
in the event of an emergency evacuation. '
Current emergency exit row seating regulations are not sufficient to educate exit row passengers on safety information. To
combat this problem as well as compensate historically undercompensated injured air travelers, exit row passengers
should be held liable for injuries resulting from their inadequate attention to safety instructions. Although various complicated issues are involved, a negligence cause of action appears
to be a viable way of imposing this liability. Hopefully, aviation
* J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, Order of the
Coif, summa cum laude, 2003; B.A., Economics and French, Duke University,
summa cum laude, 1998.
1 Travelocity.com, Getting a Good Seat, at http://dest.travelocity.com under
Tips & Advice (last visited June 1, 2003).
2 Id.; see also FreeTravelTips.com, which recommends: "If you fear being
seated next to children, you might want to check out the emergency exit row.
Emergency exit row seats also have more legroom and often have an overhead
compartment, but the seats may not recline." FreeTravelTips.com, Airline Tips:
Picking Your Seat, at http://www.freetraveltips.com under Travel Tips (last visited
June 1, 2003).
3 National Transportation Safety Board, Abstract of Final Report on the Public
Meeting of June 27, 2000, Safety Study: Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Airplanes, NTSB SS-00/01.
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attorneys will use this article as a guide to litigating of this new
cause of action.
II.

CURRENT REGULATIONS RELATING TO EMERGENCY
EXIT SEATING ON COMMERCIAL AIRLINES

The airline is responsible for determining "the suitability of
each person it permits to occupy an exit seat."4 An exit row passenger must be capable of performing the following applicable
functions:
1) Locate the emergency exit;
2) Recognize the emergency exit opening mechanism;
3) Comprehend the instructions for operating the emergency
exit;
4) Operate the emergency exit;
5) Assess whether opening the emergency exit will increase the
hazards to which passengers may be exposed;
6) Follow oral directions and hand signals given by a
crewmember;
7) Stow or secure the emergency exit door so that it will not impede use of the exit;
8) Assess the condition of an escape slide, activate the slide, and
stabilize the slide after deployment to assist others in getting off
the slide,
9) Pass expeditiously through the emergency exit; and
10) Assess, select, and follow a safe path away from the emer5
gency exit.
Among the reasons why a passenger might be unable to perform the necessary functions are: (1) a lack of physical mobility
or strength, (2) an age of less than 15 years, (3) an inability to
read and understand instructions, and (4) a lack of sufficient
6
visual or aural capacity.
The airline is further required to include passenger information cards at each seat informing the passenger of the applicable
functions and the selection criteria. 7 These cards must include
a request that a passenger identify himself for reseating if he
does not meet the selection criteria, cannot perform or does not
want to perform the applicable functions, or may suffer bodily
injury as a result of performing one of those functions.8 An ap4
5
6

7

14
14
14
14

8 Id.

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§
§
§
§

121.585(a)(1) (2002).
121.585(d) (2002).
121.585(b) (2002).
121.585(e)(1) (2002).
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propriate crewmember must refer to the cards during the oral
briefing of the passengers, and mention that the cards include
the emergency exit row passenger selection criteria and the
functions to be performed by the exit row passenger.9 The
crewmember must also orally request that emergency exit row
passengers identify themselves for reseating if they do not meet
the criteria or if they cannot or do not wish to perform the functions listed on the card.' °
Prior to takeoff, an appropriate crewmember must also orally
inform all passengers of the location of emergency exits; however, an oral explanation of the emergency functions is not required."a Rather, the crewmember must merely refer exit row
passengers to printed cards 12 containing "[d]iagrams of, and
methods of operating, the emergency exits."1 3 The emergency
exit operating handles must also be marked with instructions for
opening, the specifications of which depend on the type of
exit. 4
Despite the extensive regulation of the qualifications necessary to sit in an exit row, the exit row passenger is not required
to actually read and understand the printed card containing instructions on how to operate the emergency exits. 5 Rather, the
passenger is merely required to possess the ability "to read and
understand instructions. '"16 Since an oral briefing of the instructions is similarly not required, an exit row passenger could feasibly wait until an emergency situation arises before attempting to
understand the operation of the emergency exits.

9 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(h) (2002).
10 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(i) (2002).
11 14 C.F.R. § 121.571(a)(ii) (2002).
12 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(h) (2002); FAA, Passenger Safety Information Briefing and
Briefing Cards, Advisory Circular No. 121-24B, at app. 1 (Feb. 1, 1999), available at
http://wwwl.faa.gov/avr/afs/acs/ac12124b.pdf [hereinafter Briefing Cards].
13 14 C.F.R. § 121.571(b) (2002).
14 14 C.F.R. § 121.310(e) (2002).
15 "Although regulations require passengers to be screened for exit row seating, according to the information obtained from this study, the screening does
not guarantee that the passenger has read the safety briefing card or understands
how to open or stow Type III overwing exit hatches after reading the card."
NTSB, Safety Recommendation, A-00-72 through -91, at 5 (July 14, 2000), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2000/AO0 72_9 1 .pdf.
16 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(b) (3) (2002).
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III.

POLICY REASONS FOR HOLDING UNINFORMED
EMERGENCY EXIT ROW PASSENGERS LIABLE
FOR RESULTANT INJURIES

The rationale behind tort law accomplishes two basic social
goals: deterring injurers from perpetrating social harms and
compensating victims for individual harms. 7 Thus, tort liability
addresses the problems of exit row passenger inattention to
safety information and of undercompensation of injured international air travelers. Specifically, holding exit row passengers
liable for damages resulting from their inattention to safety
materials would deter exit row passengers from ignoring safety
information and compensate those victims harmed as a result of
exit row passengers' inattention.
A.

POTENTIAL LIABILITY WOULD DETER EMERGENCY EXIT Row
PASSENGERS FROM IGNORING EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Emergency exit row passengers are not currently motivated to
read and understand emergency instructions. In 1999, the Federal Aviation Administration, recognizing that "motivating people, even when their own personal safety is involved, is not easy,"
issued an Advisory Circular suggesting ways to make passenger
briefing cards more interesting and attractive.18 For example,
the FAA suggested that "the card should have an eye-catching
title or symbol identifying itself as safety or emergency instructions ... a multicolored card which has pictures and drawings
will be picked up and read more often than a black and white
printed card."' 9 Despite efforts by the FAA to motivate exit row
passengers, a 2000 NTSB safety study found that the majority of
passengers seated in exit rows do not read the safety instructions
containing information on how to operate emergency exits and
that many passengers continue to ignore preflight safety
briefings.2z
Exit row passengers' inattention to safety briefings is dangerous. In compiling its 2000 Safety Study, the NTSB studied in
17See The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1783, 1795 & 1795 n.83
(May 2000) (summarizing "more than a quarter-century of law and economics
scholarship"). The "underpinnings of common law tort liability [are] compensation and deterrence." Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 990 (Cal.
1998) (citing Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991)).
18 Briefing Cards, supra note 13, at app. 1.
19 Id.

20 NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 23.
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detail four cases involving evacuations using overwing exits. 21
The NTSB expects that these exits will be opened primarily by
passengers. 22 In three of those four cases, passengers had difficulty opening the exits, "unnecessarily causing passengers to
wait to use the exits. ' 23 Although no additional injuries resulted
from the unnecessary delays in these three cases, the NTSB recognizes that "there exists the potential that future difficulties
could result in injuries. "24
As an example of potential injury resulting from passenger
difficulty in opening emergency exits, the NTSB cites the 1985
evacuation of an aircraft in Manchester, England. 25 The aircraft, carrying 131 passengers and six crew members on a charter flight, began accelerating down the runway at Manchester
International Airport. 26 About thirty-six seconds later, prior to
lifting off, the left engine "suffered an uncontained failure,
which punctured a wing fuel tank access panel. Fuel leaking
from the wing ignited and burnt as a large plume of fire trailing
directly behind the engine.

'27

After the commander stopped

the aircraft, smoke entered the cabin and then a fire developed
inside the cabin. 28 The United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch's report on this accident questioned passenger
delay in exiting the burning aircraft:
Perhaps the most striking feature of this accident was the fact
that although the aircraft never became airborne and was
brought to a halt in a position which allowed an extremely rapid
fire-service attack on the external fire, it resulted in 55 deaths.
is why the passengers did not get off the aircraftsuffiThe major question
29
ciently quickly.
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.

26 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Aircraft Incident Report No. 8/88, Report on the accident to Boeing 737-236, G-BGJL at ManchesterInternational Airport on 22 August 1985, at synopsis (Dec. 1988), available at http://www.
aaib.dft.gov.uk/formal/gbgjl/gbgjl.htm; see also Hans Fries, The aeroplanefire in
Manchester August 22, 1985, SOCIALSTYRELSEN, available at http://www.sos.se/sos/
publ/REFERENG/9103014E.htm (last visited June 1, 2003); AirDisaster.Com,
Special Report: British Airtours Flight KT28M, at http://www.airdisaster.com/special/special-bakt28m.shtml (last visited June 1, 2003).
27 Report on the accident to Boeing 737-236, supra note 27, at synopsis.
28

Id.

29

Id. at 2.7 (emphasis added).
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One of the reasons that passengers did not evacuate sufficiently quickly was passenger difficulty in opening an overwing
hatch in the center cabin. ° It took three passengers over 45
seconds to open the right overwing escape hatch (compared to
six seconds for the upper cabin exit)1 The window exit passenger first pulled on the handle of the seat adjacent to the exit.
Another passenger then "reached over the window exit passenger and pulled on the release handle. The exit hatch fell inward, trapping the passenger next to the exit. ' 32 The passenger
was finally freed when a third passenger lifted the hatch and
placed it on a seat.3 3

Only twenty-seven survivors escaped

through this right overwing exit, out of "the 76 passengers from
the rear of the aircraft for whom this was the
first available exit,
34
and the 100 for whom it was the nearest."
The NTSB Safety Study further found that exit row passengers, in addition to having difficulty opening the exits, had
trouble assessing the conditions outside the exit and deciding
whether to open the exit.3 For example, in one case, a passenger unwisely opened an emergency exit, allowing smoke to
enter the cabin." After recognizing the numerous difficulties
encountered by exit row passengers during evacuation, the
NTSB concluded: "[O]ne reason for these difficulties
was pas37
provided.
materials
safety
the
to
inattention
senger
In response to the NTSB Safety Recommendation, the FAA
issued its own recommendations about how air carriers should
handle exit row seating.38 To specifically combat the problem of
passenger inattention to safety materials, the FAA recommended that flight attendants individually brief exit row passengers on their exit seat responsibilities. 9 In response to this
recommendation, however, airlines argued "that increasing
flight attendants' responsibilities for briefing passengers in exit
seats during the boarding phase of flight would be less effective
30

31

Id. at 2.7.1.
NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 5.

32 Id.
33

Report on the accident to Boeing 737-236, supra note 27, at 2.7.1.

34 Id.

35 NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 6-7.
36

Id. at 7.

37 Id.
38 FAA, Air CarrierExit Seating Program Development, Flight Standards Handbook

Bulletin for Air Transportation,HBAT 01-02 (Apr. 12, 2001), available at http://
wwwl .faa.gov/avr/afs/hbat/hbat002.pdf.
39 Id.
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than all passengers hearing the announcements about exit seats,
that additional briefings would repeat information provided in
predeparture announcements and exit-seat briefing cards, and
that the potential for delay of flights would increase."40 Even if
the airlines instigated individual briefings of exit row passengers, it remains to be seen whether exit row passengers would be
motivated to pay attention to the instructions.
In contrast, the threat of potential liability for inattention to
safety materials would motivate exit row passengers to read and
understand exit row safety procedures, thus ameliorating the
current dangerous situation.
B.

EXIT PASSENGER LIABILITY WOULD COMPENSATE INJURED
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVELERS WHO ARE
HISTORICALLY UNDERCOMPENSATED FOR
THEIR INJURIES

Injured international air travelers are historically undercompensated for their injuries as a result of limitations on air carrier
liability. The Warsaw Convention,4 1 an international treaty to
which the United States is a signatory, applies to "all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed
by aircraft for hire."4 2 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention subjects the air carrier to strict liability "for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused
the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."4 3 The Warsaw Convention limits this liability, however, to
125,000 French francs (which is the equivalent of about
$8300) 4 4 per passenger, unless the carrier and passenger agree
45
to a higher limit by special contract.
Flight Safety Foundation, Many Passengersin Exit Seats Benefit From Additional
Briefings, CABIN CREW SAFETY, May-June 2001, at 9, available at http://www.asasi.
org/apcswg/papers/ccsrmay-june01 .pdf.
41 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
42 Warsaw Convention, supra note 41, at art. 1 (1).
43 Id. at art. 17.
4 Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
40

2000).
45 Warsaw Convention, supra note 42, at art. 22(1).
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In 1966, the United States gave notice of denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention, "emphasizing that such action was solely
because of the Convention's low limits of liability for personal
injury or death to passengers." 46 To placate the United States
and prevent the United States' denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 47 the world's airlines entered into the Montreal Agreement.4 Under this agreement, the airlines promised to enter
into special contracts with all passengers to raise the liability limitation to $75,000 for all international flights originating, terminating or having a connecting point in the United States.4 9 This
$75,000 limit could only be surpassed if the airline engaged in
"willful misconduct. ' 50 Although this higher liability limit improved upon the Warsaw Convention's limit, injured international passengers were still routinely undercompensated for
their injuries.5 1
In 1996, the air carriers executed the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, 52 again raising the limit of strict
liability for compensatory damages to 100,000 "Special Drawing
Rights. ' 53 Furthermore, an injured passenger can surpass this
compensatory damages limit unless the "carrier can show it took
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to take such measures. 5 4 As a result of air carriers' agreements to contract with passengers for higher liability
limits, injured international passengers are more likely to be
fully compensated for their injuries. These plaintiffs are still
constrained, however, in their ability to recover. For example,
46 Order Approving Agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (May 18, 1966).
47 "The purpose of such action is to provide a basis upon which the United

States could withdraw its notice of denunciation." Id.
Id.
49 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
48

the Hague Protocol, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by
Executive Order No. 23,680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40105 (2002) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
50 Warsaw Convention, supra note 42, at art. 25.
51 See, e.g., Eloise Cotugno, Comment, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintiffs
From EitherCourts or Legislature- Montreal Protocol3 Drowns in Committee, 58J. AIR L.
& COM. 745, 758 (1993).
52 International Air Transport Association, Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (Jan. 8, 1997), availableat http://www.iata.org/NR/ContentConnector/CS2000/siteinterface/pdf/legal/iia.pdf.
53 A Special Drawing Right is an accounting unit developed by the International Monetary Fund. See IMF, Special Drawing Rights: A Factsheet (Apr. 2003),
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.
54 Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, 177 F.3d 1272, 1282 n.5 (l1th Cir. 1999).
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since the Warsaw Convention limits recovery to damages for
"bodily injury, ' 55 damages for mental injuries are not compensable absent "death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of
injury."56 Additionally, punitive damages are not available
under the Warsaw Convention.57
If an international passenger were injured in part because an
exit row passenger failed to perform his emergency duties, the
ability to seek compensation from that exit row passenger would
help offset the undercompensation resulting from the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits. Additionally, without the Warsaw
Convention's restriction on recovery to "bodily injury,"58 plaintiffs could potentially seek compensation for emotional distress
to the extent allowed by state law. Finally, unlike under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs could potentially seek punitive damages against the exit row passenger, to the extent allowed by
state law.59
IV.

NEGLIGENCE

If an exit row passenger ignores safety information and subsequently poorly performs his emergency functions (e.g., by taking
too long to open the emergency exit), the exit row passenger
could plausibly be liable for other passengers' injuries or deaths.
An injured passenger could attempt to impose liability with a
common law negligence action, and a deceased passenger's beneficiary could attempt to impose liability under a wrongful death
statute. Since wrongful death is not recoverable at common law,
every state has enacted a wrongful death statute, which extends
common law negligence principles to wrongful death actions.6"
To succeed on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must
establish four elements: duty, breach, proximate cause, and
damages.6 Each of these elements must be analyzed to determine if an injured passenger could use this cause of action to
hold an exit row passenger liable.
55 Warsaw Convention, supra note 42, at art. 17.
56

E. Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).

57 See In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267,

1288 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie I].
58 Warsaw Convention, supra note 42, at art. 17.
59 Lockerbie I, supra note 58, at 1288.
60 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
ed. 1984).
61 WILLIAM

L.

THE LAW OF

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS

TORTS § 127 (5th

§ 30 (3d ed. 1964).
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A.

Dumy

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 broadly states: "The
fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his
part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself
impose upon him a duty to take such action. '6 2 The American
Law Institute uses the follow example to illustrate this concept
of duty:
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an
approaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a
word or touch without delaying his own progress. A does not do
so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B
from stepping into the street, and is not liable to B.6 3
If this no-duty rule were left to stand alone, it would follow
that an exit row passenger does not have a duty to his fellow
passengers to inform himself of his emergency functions nor to
attempt to perform his emergency functions. This broad statement of non-duty is limited, however, by § 323:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
such undertaking.6 4
Based on this provision, it appears that, if B had undertaken
to lead the blind man safely across the street, B would have had
a duty to exercise reasonable care in performing his undertaking. Consequently, for the exit row passenger to have a duty to
perform his exit row functions with reasonable care, he must
have undertaken to "render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person
65
or things.
In making this determination, two interrelated issues must be
resolved. First, which exit row functions qualify as "services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protec62 RESTATEMENT
63

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 314 (1965).

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 323 (1965).

Id. illus. 1.

64 RESTATEMENT

65 Id.
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tion of the other's person?"66 Second, at what point does the
exit row passenger undertake to render these services?
Actual emergency functions, such as assessing whether it is
prudent to open the emergency exit6 7 and operating the emergency door,68 would most likely be classified as "services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection
of the other's person."69 Operating an emergency door is comparable to other services that have been classified as this type of
service. For example, undertaking a Coast Guard rescue operation, 7 0 putting salt onto an icy parking lot,7 1 and offering to help
a customer lash his merchandise to his truck 72 are all services
that, once undertaken, impose a duty of care on the performer.
It is less clear, however, whether simply agreeing to be an exit
row passenger would qualify as performing a service "to another
which he should73recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person.
If actual emergency functions are the only exit row activities
that qualify as "services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person,"74 then there
are two lines of authority that fix different points in time as the
moment that the exit row passenger undertakes to render these
services. 75 This is relevant because it is only upon undertaking
to perform these services that the exit passenger assumes a duty
of care.76
Under the traditional distinction between tort and contract
law, a defendant's promise to render services does not qualify as
an undertaking to render those services.77 Rather, it is only
upon actually entering into performance of these services that
he undertakes to render them.78 Under this concept, the exit
66
67
68

Id.
14 C.F.R. § 121.585(d)(5) (2002).
14 C.F.R. § 121.585(d)(4) (2002).

OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
Sagan v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
71 Kostidis v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 754 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
72 Marquez v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D. Mass.
2001).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323.
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
70

74 Id.

75 Id. cmt. on caveat (d).

Id.
Id. cmt. on caveat (d); see also KEETON, supra note 61, at § 56.
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. on caveat (d); see also KEETON,
supra note 61, at § 56.
76

77
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row passenger would not undertake to render emergency functions until actually beginning to perform them. As a result, the
duty to exercise reasonable care in performing these services
would only arise when the passenger begins to perform them.
Consequently, the passenger's failure to exercise reasonable
care in reading and understanding the safety information cards
would have occurred prior to the passenger's duty to exercise
reasonable care.
The modern law, however, blurs the distinction between
promising to render services and undertaking to render services.7 9 Under this view, the exit row passenger's implied promise to perform emergency functions would qualify as an
undertaking of those services, 0 and the passenger's duty to exercise reasonable care would have arisen prior to his failure to
exercise reasonable care in reading and understanding the
safety information.
On the other hand, if simply being an exit row passenger who
is "on call" in case of an emergency qualifies as a service "to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things," then the distinction between a promise to perform services and performance of those
services is irrelevant. By sitting in an exit row, the exit row passenger would have begun performance of those services. As a
result, the duty to exercise reasonable care would be imposed at
this point in time, prior to the exit row passenger's failure to
exercise reasonable care in reading and understanding the
safety information.
Consequently, the plaintiff has two alternative arguments for
imposing a duty on the exit row passenger to read and understand the safety cards. First, the plaintiff could attempt to classify the act of being an exit row passenger as one who is "on call"
in case of an emergency as a service "to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person." In making this argument, the plaintiff could emphasize that overwing exits are expected to be opened by passengers8 ' and that the exit row passengers are orally requested to
identify themselves for reseating if they do not want to perform
the emergency exit functions or may suffer bodily injury as a
79 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS

§ 323 cmt. on caveat (d); see also KEETON,

supra note 61, at § 56.
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 323

cmt. on caveat

supra note 61, at § 56.
81 NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 4.

(d); see also KEETON,
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result of performing one of those functions.8 2 The plaintiff
could plausibly argue that this oral request should alert an exit
row passenger that, by agreeing to sit in an exit row, the passenger is performing a service necessary to the safety of his fellow
passengers. In response, the defendant may argue that since
emergency exit rows are not required to be occupied, the defendant's merely being an exit row passenger does not qualify as a
service "necessary for the protection" of his fellow passengers.8 3
This argument is weak, however, because it is the act of being
"on call" that is a necessary service, not the actual occupation of
the exit row. If the exit row is unoccupied, the flight attendant
undertakes the service of being "on call."'8 4 As a result, the absence of a requirement that the exit row be occupied means that
sitting in the exit row and being "on call" in the case of an emergency is a necessary service for the protection of others.
If, however, the act of merely being an exit row passenger
does not qualify as a service "to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person, 85 the
plaintiff has an alternative argument for imposing a duty to read
and understand the safety cards. Since the actual emergency
functions are likely classified as services "to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person, 8 6 the plaintiff could argue that these services were undertaken when the exit row passenger agreed to occupy an exit
row, and which operated as an implied promise to perform
these functions. Thus, since the passenger would already have
assumed a duty to use reasonable care in performing the emergency functions, the passenger would have a derivative duty to
educate himself on the proper performance of these functions.
If both of these alternative arguments fail, the plaintiff is constrained to a late-arising duty of care that would only arise once
an actual emergency situation exists. As a result, at the time that
the passenger ignored the safety information, he would not have
been under a duty to inform himself.

82

14 C.F.R. § 121.585(i) (2002).

83 While FAA regulations require a carrier to determine the suitability of an

exit row passenger, FAA regulations do not require the exit row to be occupied.
84 See NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 4.
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323.
86

Id.
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B.

BREACH

If the plaintiff successfully argues that the exit row passenger
has a duty to exercise reasonable care upon agreeing to sit in an
exit row seat, then the breach of that duty is relatively simple to
establish. In assessing the standard of reasonable care to determine whether that standard has been breached, a risk-utility
analysis is helpful. The risk-utility analysis was quantified by
Judge Learned Hand in what has become known as the "BPL
Formula":
[T]he owner's duty... is a function of three variables: (1) It]he
probability [of the event occurring]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury... ; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly
it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied
by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL. s7
Applying the "BPL Formula" to an exit passenger's inattention to safety materials is relatively straightforward. The
probability (P) of an exit passenger's being required to perform
his emergency exit functions is relatively low. The burden (B)
of his reading the safety information is also low, requiring only a
few minutes of attention. The gravity (L) of the injury resulting
from an emergency exit passenger's failure to perform his duties, however, is extremely high, and includes physical injury
and death. Applying the "BPL Formula," it is likely that B is less
than PL. Thus, if the exit row passenger fails to inspect the
safety card after having been notified that an exit row passenger
must be able to perform certain functions88 and that the safety
card explains these functions, 89 the passenger has probably
breached his duty of care.
However, if the plaintiff is only successful in arguing that the
duty to exercise reasonable care arises upon the passenger's performance of emergency functions such as opening the emergency exit, a breach of that duty will be much more difficult to
establish. Since the passenger's failure to read and understand
the safety information occurred prior to the imposition of a duty
to exercise reasonable care, it would not qualify as a breach of
that duty. Rather, only those actions by the exit row passenger
after the start of the emergency situation would be subject to a
U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
88 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(h) (2002).
87

89

Id.
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duty of reasonable care. Without a prior duty to inform himself
of his emergency functions, a passenger opening the emergency
exit door too slowly or unwisely deciding to open the exit, is
unlikely to be found negligent because the confusion and panic
of the emergency situation would be factored into the determination of breach.
At common law, the inclusion of emergency circumstances in
determining breach was accomplished by instructing the jury on
the "sudden emergency doctrine."9 The American Law Institute articulates this doctrine as follows: "In determining whether
conduct is negligent toward another, the fact that the actor is
confronted with a sudden emergency which requires rapid decision is a factor in determining the reasonable character of his
choice of action."'" This doctrine is a special application of the
standard articulation of duty as the conduct of a "reasonable
man under like circumstances."92
Modern cases have increasingly criticized the instruction of
juries on the "sudden emergency doctrine" because, rather than
explaining to the jury that emergency circumstances are a factor
in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's actions,
the instruction has a "tendency to elevate its principles above
what is required to be proven in a negligence action.19 3 These

cases hold that, because the "existence of an emergency is simply one of the circumstances contemplated by the normal standard of care, 9 4 a "reasonable care" instruction is sufficient to
take into consideration the excitement and confusion that normally accompany an emergency situation.9"
Regardless of whether the jury is instructed on the "sudden
emergency doctrine" or merely on "reasonable care," the jury
would probably be reluctant to second-guess the defendant's
slow opening of the exit or unwise decision to open the exit. As
a result, if the plaintiff is unsuccessful in arguing that the duty to
exercise reasonable care arises prior to the passenger's actual
performance of emergency functions, a breach of that late-arising duty will be very difficult to establish.
90 Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, MODERN STATUS OF THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY
DOCTRINE, 10

A.L.R. 5th 680 (1993).

91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296(1).
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 cmt.

b (1965) (referring to § 283).

93 See, e.g., Knapp v. Sanford, 392 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1980).
94 Id. at 199.
95 See, e.g., McClymont v. Morgan, 470 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Neb. 1991); Bayer v.

Shupe Bros. Co., 576 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Kan. 1978).

464

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
C.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

Once duty and breach have been established, the plaintiff
must show that the breach proximately caused his injury. Establishing the element of proximate cause is multi-faceted. Most
states require (1) that the breach be an actual cause of the injury and (2) that the injury be a foreseeable consequence of the
injury.9 6 Actual cause is typically determined with the "but for"
test, which asks whether, more likely than not, the same result
would have occurred if the actor had not breached his duty.
The element of foreseeability encompasses a policy-based inquiry into whether the defendant should bear the burden of
compensating the plaintiff. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
identified six public policy reasons for denying recovery:
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) The
injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the
negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly
extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the
harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or (5) because
allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for
fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a
97
field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Notably, there may be multiple proximate causes of an injury;
thus, a plaintiff is not forced to choose among multiple
tortfeasors.98 Applied to this case, the exit row passenger need
not be liable to the exclusion of the airline and the
manufacturer.
If the plaintiff establishes that the passenger had a duty to
read and understand the emergency instructions and that the
passenger breached this duty, then a "but for" chain of causation must be shown between the passenger's failure to inform
himself and the plaintiff's injury. This chain requires the showing of two links: (1) that, but for the exit passenger's inattention
to the safety materials, he would have performed his emergency
functions properly; and (2) that, but for the exit passenger's improperly performing his emergency functions, the plaintiff
would not have been injured.
See, e.g., Whitlaw v. Kroker Co., 410 S.E.2d 251, 253 (S.C. 1991); Bell v.Jones,
523 A.2d 982, 995 (D.C. 1986); Barefoot v. Joyner, 154 S.E.2d 543, 547-48 (N.C.
1967).
97 Peters v. Menard, 589 N.W.2d 395, 405 (Wis. 1999).
96

98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 447 (1965).
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Although the first link in this chain seems clear on its face,
the exit row passenger can make a plausible argument that, even
if he had read the safety materials, he would not have performed better because the materials are inadequate. In support, the defendant can cite a 2000 NTSB Safety
Recommendation which states: "[D]espite guidance in the form
of FAA advisory circulars, many air carrier safety briefing cards
do not clearly communicate safety information to passengers.
Therefore, the Safety Board believes the FAA should require
minimum comprehension testing for safety briefing cards."99
This NTSB recommendation, based on two 1997 studies which
found passenger comprehension of safety cards to be low, 10
casts doubt on whether the exit row passenger's inattention
would be classified as a "but for" cause of his poor performance.
Furthermore, the second link in the chain of causation would
require an even more difficult showing since the necessity of an
exit row passenger's performing any emergency functions would
not arise outside the context of an emergency. It would be very
difficult to show that, more probably than not, the exit row passenger's performing his functions competently would have prevented the plaintiffs injuries.
If the "but for" chain of causation fails, the plaintiff could,
however, attempt to establish actual cause with a showing of
"loss of chance." This controversial causation theory is conceptually founded on the American Law Institute's articulation of
cause in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323.101
Under section 323, a plaintiff can meet the burden of showing
actual cause by establishing one of two prongs: (1) that "his failure to exercise such care increase [d] the risk of such harm" or
(2) that "the harm [was] suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking. "102 Essentially, a "loss of chance" theory
allows the plaintiff to establish actual cause "by showing a 'sub- NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 24.
100 In the first study, 113 subjects were asked the meaning of 36 pictorials taken
randomly from 50 safety briefing cards: 12 of 36 pictures were understood by
more than 67 percent of the subjects whereas 20 of the 36 pictures were understood by less than 50 percent of the subjects. In the second study, 120 subjects
were shown a briefing card.. .and were asked the meaning of the 40 pictorials.
Two-thirds (67 percent) of the subjects understood the meaning of only half (21)
of the 40 pictures. Id.
101Pelas v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 97-3779, 1999 WL 438478, at *2
(E.D. La. June 28, 1999).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323.
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stantial possibility' that the harm would have been averted had
the defendant acted in a non-negligent manner."' 10
Blinzler v. MarriottInternational,Inc.,"°4 an example of the "loss
of chance" theory applied in a rescue context, is instructive on
the possible use of this theory by the plaintiff. In Blinzler, a hotel
guest, upon her husband's sensing the onset of a heart attack,
called the hotel operator, who agreed to call an ambulance.
The operator did not call an ambulance until at least fourteen
minutes later. In the meantime, the wife watched her husband
die.1 5 A renowned cardiologist testified that his death would
have been forestalled had the paramedics reached the scene ten
minutes earlier. 0 6 The Court of Appeals found that there was
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to "conclude that the
defendant's omission negated a substantial possibility that the
0 7
rescue efforts would have succeeded.'

If the plaintiff successfully establishes actual cause with the
"but for" test or the "loss of chance" theory, the plaintiff must
then establish that his injury was a foreseeable result of the exit
row passenger's breach. Undeniably, it is foreseeable that an
exit row passenger's inattention to safety information could result in his poor performance of his safety functions, which could
result in injuries to other passengers. Additionally, strong policy
arguments support the imposition of liability on exit row passengers for their inattention to safety information. Imposition of
liability would deter exit row passengers from ignoring emergency instructions and compensate injured air travelers."0
If the plaintiff is only able to establish a late-arising duty of
care that arises once an actual emergency situation exists, then,
because of the "sudden emergency doctrine," it is unlikely that
the plaintiff could establish that the defendant breached his
duty. 10 9 If, however, the plaintiff were able to establish the element of breach, then the causation analysis would be very similar to the one discussed above, except less complex. Instead of a
two-part chain of causation, however, only one link would have
to be established. Specifically, the plaintiff would have to show
that, but for the defendant's incompetent performance of his
Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1996).
Id.
105 Id. at 1150.
106 Id. at 1152.
107 Id.
108See supra text accompanying notes 18-60.
109See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
103
104
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emergency functions, the plaintiff would not have been injured.
As above, if this showing is not possible, then the plaintiff could
attempt to establish actual cause with a "loss of chance" theory.
Additionally, it is foreseeable that the plaintiffs incompetent
performance of his emergency functions would result in injury
to a fellow passenger.
D.

DAMAGES

Recovery under the voluntary undertaking doctrine is typically limited to cases of physical harm.1"' Since a passenger injured as a result of an exit passenger's inattention would likely
suffer physical harm, this element would be met.
E.
1.

POTENTIAL DEFENSES

Warsaw Convention

If the accident occurred on an international flight, an exit
row passenger could argue that (1) he was acting as an agent of
the air carrier when he breached his duty to exercise reasonable
care and (2) the protections of the Warsaw Convention extend
to a carrier's non-employee, non-contractual agents. If the exit
row passenger were to prevail on both of these arguments, a
plaintiff could not recover from the passenger and the air carrier together "a sum greater than that recoverable in a suit
against the carrier itself as limited by the Warsaw Convention
with its applicable agreements and protocols."'111 As a result, in
a case governed by the Warsaw Convention, one of the primary
motivations of suing the exit row passenger as opposed to
merely the carrier (i.e., to bypass the Warsaw Convention's liability limits) would disappear.11 2 The plaintiff, however, has strong
counter-arguments to the exit row passenger's asserted defense.
Although the exit row passenger is neither an employee nor
an independent contractor of the airline, he has a colorable argument that he was acting as an agent of the carrier when he
performed his emergency exit functions. An agent-principal relationship "results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act."' 3
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323; see also Weisblatt v. Chicago Bar
Assoc., 684 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
lIl Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
112 See supra text accompanying notes 42-60.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF AGENCY § 1

(1957).
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The element of mutual consent is clearly met. The carrier is
responsible for determining "the suitability of each person it
permits to occupy an exit seat."'1 14 Similarly, exit row passengers
are orally requested to identify themselves for reseating if they
do not meet the selection criteria or cannot or do not wish to
perform the functions listed on the passenger information
cards. '1 Additionally, the defendant could cite the carrier's
power to re-seat an exit row passenger as evidence of the carrier's control over him.1 16
Whether the exit row passenger has agreed to act on behalf of
the carrier1 17 is more complicated. The defendant could probably successfully argue, however, that the exit row passenger, by
agreeing to sit in the exit row, has agreed to act on behalf of the
carrier. In support, the exit passenger could argue that, in the
event that no passengers were willing to occupy the exit row
seats, the air carrier's employees would assume the emergency
exit duties.' 1 8 In making this argument, however, the defendant
would find himself in the odd position of arguing that he did
not assume a duty of care upon agreeing to sit in the exit row
seat but that he did agree to act as an agent of the carrier upon
agreeing to sit in the exit row seat.
Assuming that the defendant were, however, able to successfully straddle these seemingly inconsistent arguments, the second prong of his defense would also be tenuous. It is a question
of first impression whether the Warsaw Convention extends to
non-employee, non-contractual agents of the carrier. The case
law in this area muddies the analysis by seemingly using the
word "agent" interchangeably with the words "employee" and
"independent contractor."1 1' 9 An analysis of the reasoning behind the case law in this area, however, indicates that, while the
Warsaw Convention does extend to employees and certain independent contractors of the carrier, it should not extend to nonemployee, non-contractual agents.

H4 14 C.F.R.
115

14 C.F.R.

§ 121.585(a)(1) (2002).

§ 121.585(i) (2002).

116 14 C.F.R. § 121.585(a)(1)
117 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

(2002).

OF AGENCY § 1.

118 NTSB, Safety Recommendation, supra note 16, at 4.
119 E.g., Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 268 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2001);
Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 165, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1082-92 (2d Cir. 1977).
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The seminal case in this area is Reed v. Wier,120 which extended the Warsaw limits to a corporate officer of the carrier
based on two findings. First, "the plain language of the original
Convention... tends to support appellants' contention that its
liability limits were intended to apply to a carrier's employees." 12 1 Second, "[m]ost carriers, at their employees' insistence,
provide their employees with indemnity protection."'1 22 Consequently, to allow "a suit for an unlimited amount of damages
against a carrier's employees for personal injuries to a passenger
would unquestionably undermine this purpose behind Article
22, since it would permit plaintiffs to recover from the carrier
through its employees damages in excess of the Convention's
limits. '"123 In its discussion, the Reed opinion often uses the word
"agent" as opposed to "employee;"' 24 its holding, however, is
125
limited to employees of an air carrier.
The subsequent cases of Julius Young Jewelry ManufacturingCo.
27
v. Delta Air Lines1 26 and Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency, Inc.1
extend the holding in Reed to contractual agents "performing
functions the carrier could or would. . .otherwise perform itself."'1 28 Other courts have followed Julius and Baker,1 29 and
some have even extended Julius and Baker to apply to subcontractors.1" In these cases, courts frequently refer to contractual
agents of an air carrier as "agents," without differentiating between contractual and non-contractual agents.'' The Warsaw
Convention has never been extended, however, to apply to noncontractual agents of an air carrier.
Absent precedent extending the Warsaw Convention to noncontractual agents of the air carrier, the exit row passenger will
have difficulty arguing that the reasoning behind Reed applies to
Reed, 555 F.2d at 1079.
Id. at 1087.
122 Id. at 1090.
123 Id. at 1089.
124 Id. at 1082-92.
125 Id. at 1093.
126 Julius Young Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Delta Air Lines, 414 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1979).
127 Baker, 590 F. Supp. at 170.
128 Julius, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
12 See, e.g., Dazo, 268 F.3d at 677; Kabbani v. Int'l Total Servs., 805 F. Supp.
1033, 1039 (D.C. 1992); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21,
1988, 776 F. Supp. 710, 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie I1].
130 Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 505 (D.NJ.
2000) (citing Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana De Aviacion, 13 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
131 See, e.g., Dazo, 268 F.3d at 677; Lockerbie I, 776 F. Supp. at 714.
120

121
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this case. Unlike the assumption in Reed that "[im] ost carriers, at
their employees' insistence, provide their employees with indemnity protection, ' principals do not provide their non-contractual agents with indemnity protection. Consequently,
allowing a suit for an unlimited amount of damages against an
exit row passenger for personal injuries to another passenger
would not undermine the purpose behind Article 22.13' It
would not permit plaintiffs to recover from the carrier, through
the exit row passenger, damages in excess of the Convention's
limits.13 1 Since the reasoning for extending the Warsaw Convention's liability limits to employees and contractual agents does
not apply to non-contractual agents, it is unlikely that the exit
row passenger would succeed on this issue of first impression.
2.

Assumption of the Risk

The exit row passenger may attempt to escape liability by arguing that the plaintiff, by consenting to be a passenger, assumed the risk that the exit row passenger would negligently
perform his emergency functions. Under the traditional defense of "assumption of the risk," the defendant may have succeeded in escaping liability. Modern courts, however, have
severely limited the defense of "assumption of the risk." As it
exists today, this defense would likely fail to curtail the defendant's liability.
The traditional conception of "assumption of the risk" barred
a plaintiff from recovering in four situations: (1) where the
plaintiff expressly relieves the defendant of the obligation to exercise care for his protection; (2) where the plaintiff, by knowingly yet reasonably entering into a risky situation, impliedly
relieves the defendant of the obligation to exercise care for his
protection; (3) where the plaintiff, aware of a risk created by the
defendant's negligence, voluntarily yet reasonably proceeds to
encounter the risk; and (4) where the plaintiff voluntarily and
unreasonably encounters a known risk.'35
The exit row passenger would probably not succeed in arguing that the first or fourth situation applies. The first situation is
inapplicable because the plaintiff, by consenting to be a passenger, did not expressly relieve the exit row passenger of the obli132

Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1977).

133

Cf id.
Cf id.

134

135 RESTATEMENT
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§ 496A cmt. c (1965).
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gation to read the safety information. Similarly, the fourth
situation is inapplicable because the decision to be a passenger
in an airplane whose exit rows are occupied by fellow passengers
is not unreasonable.
In contrast, the defendant could plausibly argue that the second and third situations, which are characterized as "implied
assumptions of the risk," 136 apply. An example of the second
situation is a spectator who enters a ballpark. This spectator has
impliedly assumed the risk of being hit by the ball, and the ballplayers are relieved of the obligation to protect him from the
ball. 37 In comparison, perhaps the plaintiff, by agreeing to be a
passenger on an airplane, impliedly assumed the risk that an
exit row passenger would poorly perform the exit functions in
an emergency. As a result, the exit row passenger would be relieved of the obligation to read the safety information.
An example of the third situation is an independent contractor who discovers that his employer has negligently provided
him with a machine in dangerous condition. Because the risk of
injury is slight compared with the utility of his using the machine despite its condition, the independent contractor who operates the machine does so reasonably and voluntarily. The
independent contractor has, however, impliedly assumed the
risk of being injured by the machine. 138 In comparison, perhaps
the plaintiff observed the exit passenger's inattention to the
safety information and nonetheless chose to remain on the airplane because of the slightness of the risk in comparison to the
utility of the plaintiff's staying on the plane. In so doing, the
plaintiff would have impliedly assumed the risk of injury resulting from the exit row passenger's inattention.
Under the modern conception of "assumption of the risk,"
however, only the first and fourth situations are still recognized
as relieving the defendant from liability.13 9 The first situation,
136
137
138

Id.
Id.
Id.

139 "Sixteen states have totally abolished the doctrine of assumption of the risk.
In addition, seventeen more states have abolished the use of the implied assumption of the risk defense, thus confining the doctrine to only those extremely rare
cases where there was express contractual consent by the plaintiff." Greg Sobo,
Look Before You Leap: Can the Emergence of the Open and Obvious DangerDefense Save
Diving From Troubled Waters?, 49 SYRACUSE L. Rrv. 175, 195 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (2000)
("This Section does not apply when a plaintiffs conduct demonstrates merely
that the plaintiff was aware of a risk and voluntarily confronted it. That type of
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now known as a "contractual limitation on liability," completely
bars recovery by the plaintiff when the parties, prior to the injury, entered into a contract absolving the defendant from future liability. 140

The fourth situation is now subsumed by

"comparative negligence" and limits and sometimes extinguishes the defendant's liability. 4 ' The second and third situations, characterized as "implied assumptions of the risk," no
longer limit a plaintiffs recovery. 4 2 Consequently, regardless of
whether the exit row passenger could successfully argue that the
plaintiff impliedly assumed the risk that the exit row passenger
would ignore the safety information, the defense of "assumption
of the risk" would not bar the plaintiffs recovery under modern
law.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a negligence cause of action is a viable way to
hold an exit row passenger liable for injuries resulting from his
inattention to safety information. Although various complicated
issues would be involved in this cause of action, an injured passenger would have strong arguments in support of each.
To impose a duty on the exit row passenger to read and understand the safety cards, a plaintiff could classify the act of being an exit row passenger as a service that the passenger should
recognize as necessary for the protection of the other passengers. Alternatively, a plaintiff could impose a duty on the exit
row passenger to read and understand the safety cards by arguing that, upon agreeing to sit in an exit row, the passenger undertook to perform actual emergency functions.
If the plaintiff establishes that the exit row passenger had a
duty to read and understand the safety cards, breach of that
duty would be relatively simple to establish with the "BPL
Formula." The exit row passenger's inattention would most
likely qualify as a breach of his duty of reasonable care.
To show that the exit row passenger's breach proximately
caused the plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiff has several arguments. First, the plaintiff could attempt to establish a "but for"
conduct, which is usually called 'implied assumption of risk,' does not otherwise
constitute a defense unless it constitutes consent to an intentional tort.").
140 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2.
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. c
(2002).
142 "Except as provided in § 2 [contractual limitations on liability], no jury instruction is given on assumption of risk." Id.

2003]

EXIT ROW SEATING

473

chain of causation between the exit row passenger's inattention
and the plaintiffs injury. If this showing fails, however, the
plaintiff could attempt to establish actual cause with a showing
of "loss of chance." Finally, the plaintiff could use the policy
arguments of deterrence and compensation to argue that his
resultant injuries were a foreseeable consequence of the exit
row passenger's negligence.
Additionally, the plaintiff could combat an exit row passenger's assertion that he is protected by the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits by arguing that the passenger is not an agent of
the air carrier and that, even if the exit row passenger is an
agent of the carrier, the Warsaw Convention does not extend to
non-contractual agents of air carriers.
Finally, the defense of "assumption of the risk" as it exists today would fail to shield the exit row passenger from liability. By
consenting to be a passenger on the airplane, the plaintiff
neither contractually limits the exit row passenger's liability nor
acts negligently.
Hopefully, this article will encourage aviation attorneys to litigate this new cause of action. If exit row passengers are held
liable for their inattention to safety information, exit row passengers will take exit seating seriously, improving the safety of
air travel.
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